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ABSTRACT
Two studies investigated the idea of social identity dynamicism, that social identity is
flexible, context dependent, and strategic, at the intersection of nationality and race in the United
States. In Study 1, following exposure to a stimulus intended to induce feelings of vicarious
shame in the American identity, both Black and White Americans indicated their levels of four
types of collective self-esteem: public American, public racial, private American, and private
racial (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992). Findings showed that only Black Americans were able to
shift between their national and racial identities in response to American shame, such that the
relative valuation of their private racial identity over their private American identity was
increased, compared to the control condition. Study 2 extended the idea of a social identity shift
to the concept of target-shifting of a racially ambiguous American target. We found that in
response to a threatening American identity associated with President Obama, Black Americans
high in White American Centrism perceived the President to be physically “Whiter,” compared
to Blacks low in White American Centrism. We discuss the apparent differences between the
racial groups in both studies as a function of varying degrees of perceived association between
the American identity and each of the racial identities (Study 1) and societal norms and
constraints at play in the United States (Study 2).
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1CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
“The Caterpillar and Alice looked at each other for some time in silence: at last the Caterpillar
took the hookah out of its mouth, and addressed her in a languid, sleepy voice. ‘Who are YOU?’
said the Caterpillar.
This was not an encouraging opening for a conversation. Alice replied, rather shyly, ‘I-I hardly
know, sir, just at present – at least I know who I WAS when I got up this morning, but I think I
must have been changed several times since then.’
‘What do you mean by that?’ said the Caterpillar sternly. ‘Explain yourself!’
‘I can’t explain MYSELF, I’m afraid, sir,’ said Alice, ‘because I’m not myself, you see.’
‘I don’t see,’ said the Caterpillar.
‘I’m afraid I can’t put it more clearly,’ Alice replied very politely, ‘for I can’t understand it
myself to begin with; and being so many different sizes in a day is very confusing.’
‘It isn’t,’ said the Caterpillar.
‘Well, perhaps you haven’t found it so yet,’ said Alice; ‘but when you have to turn into a
chrysalis – you will some day, you know – and then after that into a butterfly, I should think
you’ll feel it a little queer, won’t you?’
‘Not a bit,’ said the Caterpillar.
‘Well, perhaps your feelings may be different,’ said Alice; ‘all I know is, it would feel very queer
to ME.’
‘You!’ said the Caterpillar contemptuously. ‘Who are YOU?’”
– Lewis Carroll, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland
Events that have the potency to elicit shame in Americans (e.g., the Iraq War, the 2007
financial crisis and the Obama Administration’s subsequent bailout efforts, etc.) may lead us to
question the degree to which we want to be associated with our national identity. Given that how
individuals define themselves (i.e., self-categorization) is considered to be inherently variable,
fluid, and context dependent (Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994), we question whether
individuals are capable of strategically shifting away from their national identity in response to
such events. At the same time, if individuals are capable of momentarily moving away from the
currently threatening national identity, so as to replace or compensate for the general loss of self-
esteem previously derived from that identity, we wonder whether individuals will shift toward a
different, currently less threatening, social identity. In effect, one goal of the present work is to
find support for the idea that, because individuals carry with them multiple social selves whose
2varying degrees of valence are context dependent (Deaux, 2001), people will selectively recruit,
from their collection of social identities, the one that is currently the best source of self-esteem.
We locate the study of this idea at the intersection of nationality and race, two historically
provocative social identities within the United States. Specifically, we propose that Black and
White Americans will differentially experience a social identity shift across nationality and race
given the varying degrees of perceived association between the American identity and each of
the racial identities (Devos & Banaji, 2005; Sidanius, Feshbach, Levin, & Pratto, 1997), as well
as the two groups’ dissimilar levels of identification with both the national and racial identities
(Crocker, Luhtanen, Blaine, & Broadnax, 1994) and their respective degrees of ability or
willingness to explain away the currently threatening American identity.
A second goal of the current research is to extend this idea of social identity shift beyond
just self-shifting across the social identities of nationality and race. We also investigate the
concept of target-shifting; that is, in the particular case of a biracial American target
(specifically, President Barack Obama), we suggest that Black and White Americans can
subjectively categorize the target’s racial identity in the context of a threatening American
identity. Much like personally shifting away from one social identity and toward a currently
more desirable one, we conjecture that individuals may also push away an ambiguously
classified target who is a current source of threat related to a shared social identity (i.e., President
Obama shares the American identity with both Black and White Americans, and in the event he
disparages the American identity, perhaps he can be subjectively moved away from either of the
groups’ racial identities).
In sum, the following dissertation seeks to explore the dynamic nature of social identity
and how this dynamicism may be contingent upon the social groups to which an individual
3belongs, the strength of association between those groups, and the societal and political norms at
play. Ultimately, we argue that the choice of social identity, which social identity to emphasize
and which to minimize – both for the individual himself and for a targeted other – is strategic and
context dependent. The value currently derived from a specific social identity, though the
individual may have many from which to choose (Study 1), and how the individual wishes to
categorize the social identity of another who can be conceptualized as either an in-group or out-
group member (Study 2), may be very much motivated by the individual’s need to maintain a
positive self-image.
The subsequent chapter will be organized in the following way: I will begin with a
general overview of the social identity approach within social psychology, and then specifically
emphasize the idea of social identity dynamicism that allows us to pursue a so-called “social
identity shift.” Within this section, I will discuss what might compel a social identity self-shift,
including how various forms of threat lead to this self-protective strategy. Next, I will address
the specific social identities of nationality and race, and how these two identities are related to
each other differently for Black and White Americans; here, I will also outline hypotheses for
Study 1. Finally, I will focus on the idea of target-shifting, specifically with regards to a racially
ambiguous target who shares the currently threatening social identity with the perceiver. I will
address the concepts of hypodescent (Banks & Eberhardt, 1998; Hickman, 1997) and White
American Centrism (Dach-Grushow, 2006) to better understand why and predict who within the
two racial groups will (or will not) engage in racially ambiguous target-shifting; this section will
also include the hypothesis for Study 2.
4CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 The Social Identity Approach
The social identity approach that includes both the original social identity theory (Tajfel
& Turner, 1979) and the reconceptualized and revised self-categorization theory (Turner, 1982,
1984; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987; Turner et al., 1994) defines “social
identity” as those subjective self-categories that are derived from the social groups to which an
individual belongs and in which the individual shares common characteristics or social
experiences with other members. Brewer (2001) elaborates on this construct with her definition
of group-based social identity or “we” identities, where “group identities are not forged from
interpersonal relationships between and among individual group members, but rather from
common ties to a shared category membership” (p. 119). When social identity of this type is
engaged, the individual is depersonalized and extends his self-construal to a more inclusive
social unit; in like fashion, the attributes and behaviors of the individual self are assimilated to
the representation of the group as a whole (Turner et al., 1987). In short, as we define social
identity for the purposes of this paper, the individual and the social groups to which that
individual ascribes membership are intricately bound up; identification with a social group has
the direct implication that what applies to all, applies to one.
Fundamental to the theories within the social identity approach is the idea that people are
motivated to maintain or bolster a positive image of the self. To this end, identification with a
social group is at least partially motivated by the desire to be associated with a group that is
positively regarded, perhaps both publicly (by others) and privately (by the self) (Tajfel &
Turner, 1979, 1986; see forthcoming discussion on public and private collective self-esteem,
Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992). If a social group is currently failing to provide an adequate amount
5of positive self-regard, Tajfel & Turner (1986) suggest three coping strategies that the individual
may employ in an effort to adjust either self-status or collective-status. For one, the individual
may simply leave the social group via the method of individual mobility. Whereas this strategy
may allow for the physical mobility of the individual, more often than not, individuals will only
be able to subjectively “leave the group” by lowering their identification with that group (Tajfel
& Turner, 1986). Importantly, this tactic does not provide for a change in the status of the social
group – just the individual within the group, if even that. The remaining ways in which
individuals may alter the perceived status of their in-group include social creativity (i.e.,
comparing the in-group to the out-group on some other dimension, redefining the values attached
to the in-group’s attributes, and/or selecting a different comparison out-group) and social
competition (i.e., seeking positive regard via direct competition with the out-group over scarce
resources) (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Via either of these two strategies, both the individual and the
social group should be positively affected if these methods prove effective. However, for the
purposes of laying a foundation for our proposed idea of a social identity shift, only the first
aforementioned strategy will be relevant.
2.2 Social Identity Dynamicism
Within self-categorization theory specifically, the authors emphasize the inherent
variability of self-categorization, such that how individuals currently define the content of their
social categories (and their own representativeness of this category based on this content) is
context dependent; self-categories and in-groups can be defined in entirely opposite ways on
different occasions given the presence of different environmental stimuli and/or the presence of
different out-groups (Hogg, Turner, & Davidson, 1990). According to Turner et al. (1994),
category content is selective and hardly dependent upon the long-term knowledge one has about
6what different kinds of people are like. The content of a social category to be used in context is,
for all practical purposes, created on-the-spot.
Similarly, just as within-social-category content is comparative, variable, and
contextually based, any current representation of the self as a whole is also not a fixed construct,
but is rather the expression of a dynamic process of social judgment (Turner et al., 1994).
According to Barsalou (1987), categories in general (not just social ones) are generated in
context as a function of an interaction between long-term, higher-order knowledge and the
specific set of circumstances within the current situation. Applied to the social world, the social
category one recruits to help define oneself at any given point in time will vary with goals,
current context, and recent experience. In effect then, what social category to apply when so as to
define the self in the moment (even if the content of the social category itself remains stable over
time) is a decision made from an adaptive, self-regulatory process such that the individual might
actively select one social category over another to better fit his or her relationship to the current
social reality (Turner et al., 1994).
Given that all social identity theories recognize that every individual simultaneously
belongs to an indefinite number of social categories, almost everyone identifies with multiple
types of “social identities,” and multiple “social identities” within each type (see Deaux, 1996,
for a review). According to Bodenhausen & Macrae (1998), there are a variety of different
factors that determine which one of these social categories or identities will be momentarily
emphasized in self-perception. First, contextually salient (e.g., distinct) categories will influence
current perceptions of the self (McGuire & McGuire, 1988). For instance, a Black American
might be more apt to think of himself as Black if he is surrounded by White people, but should
primarily think of himself as American when he is abroad, surrounded by non-Americans. As the
7physical composition of the environment shifts, so it is likely that one’s awareness of a particular
social category will also shift (even though the actual repertoire of social categories from which
the individual can choose will remain the same). Other work in the area of priming research has
shown that which social category takes precedence is a function of how recently and frequently
the category has been used (Bargh, Lombardi, & Higgins, 1988; Higgins, Rholes, & Jones, 1977;
Srull & Wyer, 1979). Returning to the previous example, this same Black American should be
more likely to see himself as Black if this social category is easily accessible because it was
either recently activated in a previous situation and/or it is activated frequently across situations.
More important to the current line of research, however, Bodenhausen & Macrae (1998)
explain that motivational factors can also influence the selection (conscious or not) of a social
category within a particular situation. For instance, in a series of experiments, researchers have
found that categorizations of the self and the activation of related social categories can be
contingent upon the need to maintain a positive self-image (Mussweiler, Gabriel, &
Bodenhausen, 2000). In one study within this line of work, female European American
participants who were each told that they were outperformed by an Asian American woman
actually shifted their social identity and focused on their ethnicity, the unshared social category,
opposed to their gender, the shared social category1. In this way, the participants were able to
deflect a threatening social comparison by acknowledging that the target of comparison was an
                                                 
1 To assess the relative emphasis of ethnicity over gender, Mussweiler et al. (2000) adapted three
questions taken from the Identity subscale of Luhtanen & Crocker’s (1992) Collective Self-
Esteem Scale and one question from the Centrality subscale of the Multidimensional Inventory
of Black Identity (Sellers, Rowley, Chavous, Shelton, & Smith, 1997). The four questions were
as follows: (a) “Overall, which has more to do with how you feel about yourself?” (b) “Which is
a more important part of your self-image?” (c) Which is more important to your sense of what
kind of person you are?” and (d) “Which group do you have a stronger sense of belonging to?”
Answers were giving on a rating scale that ranged from 1 (definitely my gender) to 8 (definitely
my ethnicity).
8out-group member whose performance was thereby immaterial for personal evaluation
(according to the similarity hypothesis; Festinger, 1954). According to these researchers, “it is
reassuring that our social identities are sufficiently complex and flexible to allow us to elegantly
sneak out of such potentially ego-deflating situations” (Mussweiler et al., 2000, p. 407).
Roccas and Brewer (2002) describe the more recent idea of (high) social identity
complexity as referring to an individual’s acknowledgment that memberships in multiple social
categories or in-groups are not fully convergent or overlapping. One benefit of having a
complex, more compartmentalized social identity structure where social categories are context
specific is that high social identity complexity may help individuals confront threats to the status
of any single in-group (Roccas & Brewer, 2002). For instance, Roccas (2003) found that
individuals who are high in social identity complexity and who are simultaneously members of
multiple social groups that differ in status can shift between the lower status and higher status
groups. For example, individuals will perceive a social group as having higher status and will
identify with it more if they are simultaneously members of a different social group of lower
status (Roccas, 2003). In effect, having high social identity complexity can allow for a social
identity shift that might buffer against the adverse effects of being threatened by the current
status of any particular social group to which one belongs. Researchers add that this very process
may be one reason why members of low-status, stigmatized social groups experience similar
levels of self-esteem as members of high-status social groups (Crocker & Major, 1989). In effect,
despite being a member of a stigmatized group, as long as the individual is also a member of a
more highly regarded group, he or she can derive a positive self-image from that group.
Clearly, social identity is not only flexible, but it is also strategic. In the face of threat,
such as an upward social comparison (Mussweiler et al., 2000) or being reminded that one is a
9member of a low-status group (Roccas, 2003), social identity can be mobilized in an effort to
preserve a positive self-image.
2.3 Applying National and Racial Identities to “Social Identity Shift”
To our knowledge, no work to date has investigated the social identities of nationality
and race in the United States within the context of a social identity shift. We believe that the
study of a social identity shift across nationality and race should prove interesting, especially
given that the national and racial identities are differentially related for Blacks and Whites in the
United States. As the following discussion will detail, we believe there will be differences in the
ability for Blacks and Whites to shift between their national and racial identities in the context of
a currently threatening American identity primarily because of the varying degrees of perceived
association between the American identity and the respective racial identities.
In their seminal work, “American = White?” Devos and Banaji (2005) explored the
extent to which certain American racial groups are each associated with the category
“American.” Though the researchers discuss that most Americans hold an inclusive definition of
national identity (Citrin, Haas, Muste, & Reingold, 1994; Citrin, Reingold, & Green, 1990;
Citrin, Wong, & Duff, 2001), they also argue that there remains a discrepancy between
individuals’ explicitly stated beliefs and their more implicit responses (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows,
1996; Devine, 1989; Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995).
Moreover, because White Americans, as a group, have been immersed in American society for
an extensive period of time (though not necessarily longer than other groups, i.e., Black
Americans) and constitute the numerical majority, they are perhaps more likely to be thought of
as most representative of the category “American.”
Devos and Banaji (2005) set out to test the possible assumption that “American = White”
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at both explicit and implicit levels. Findings showed that participants expressed strong
egalitarian abstract principles and valued a nonexclusionary definition of American identity.
However, even when participants were told to consider only those Americans who were born in
the United States, lived in the United States, and held U.S. citizenship, White Americans were
considered to best embody the concept “American,” followed by Black Americans, and then
Asian Americans (though both White and Black Americans were perceived as having strong ties
to the American culture). Further results of an implicit association test (IAT; Greenwald,
McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) completed solely by White Americans revealed more fine-tuned
distinctions with relative associations between each American-race pair. In effect, whereas there
was no difference in the speed of pairing “Black and American” and “Asian and American,” it
was in fact easier for these White American participants to associate “White and American” than
either “Black and American” or “Asian and American.” As for the implicit associations made by
Black Americans, a somewhat unexpected result was found. In fact, Black Americans showed an
equal association of “Black” and “White” with “American,” though they did not associate
“Asian” with “American” nearly as strongly as they associated either of the other two races with
“American” (Devos & Banaji, 2005). As an important aside and to provide contrast, Asian
Americans affirmed the “American = White” assumption and did not implicitly associate their
own group with the American category to the same extent that they associated “White” and
“American.”2
                                                 
2 Some readers may question whether the “American = White” phenomenon is a fixed, all-or-
none designation such that only Whites are considered American, or if the “American = White”
system of classification is more flexible and fluid, such that those who are categorized as
“American” must display some degree of “Whiteness” to be so named. For the purposes of this
paper and our conceptualization of which race qualifies as “American,” we emphasize that it
should not matter whether the “American = White” effect is all-or-none or more fluid in its
inclusion and exclusion of members; we argue that because such characterization may be
11
This single body of research is foundational to our framework for a differential shift
across nationality and race for Black and White Americans. In effect, whereas “White” and
“American” are tightly bound for White Americans (to be discussed below), we conjecture that
Black Americans may be better able to shift between their American and Black identities.
Although Devos and Banaji (2005) found that, for Black Americans, “Black” equates to
“American” to the same extent that “White” does, other research contends that given the inherent
power structure within United States society, Blacks may still consider “White” (versus “Black”)
to be more representative of “American.” According to social dominance theory (Sidanius &
Pratto, 1999), as relations between ethnic groups in the United States are characterized by
inequalities in power and social status, White Americans – who have more power and greater
social status compared to other social groups – are seen as “owning” the nation. Given this
perception, the relationship between ethnic (i.e., racial) and American identities is found to be
asymmetrical across ethnic groups (Sidanius et al., 1997), such that the national and racial
identities strongly converge for the dominant group in society (i.e., White Americans), but are
distinct, even potentially conflicting, for members of other American racial groups. Sidanius et
al. (1997) lament that although the average Black family has been in the United States longer
than the average White family, and that Blacks should be considered as “American” as Whites (if
not more), due to chronic racial inequality, the link between “Black” and “American” will not be
as strong for Blacks as the link between “White” and “American.” Additionally, Sidanius et al.
                                                                                                                                                              
partially motivated (i.e., for political reasons, to maintain a power differential), the “American =
White” effect should theoretically be qualified by the perceiver’s own race. If the individual
wants to be perceived as American, then his racial group should equate to the American identity.
Likewise, if the individual wants to keep out a certain group from the American identity or wants
his racial group to be dissociated from a negative American identity, then the equation should
change accordingly.
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(1997) and others (Phinney, Cantu, & Kurtz, 1997) find an inverse relationship between racial
and American identification for Black Americans, suggesting perhaps that the two are
conceptualized as distinct categories and that identification with one may even preclude
identification with the other. Other research amends this point, indicating that although Blacks
may perceive themselves to be as American as Whites, they also recognize a lower perception of
their Americanness by other groups in society and even a sense of exclusion from the American
identity, primarily by White Americans (Barlow, Taylor, & Lambert, 2000). This probable
feeling of disconnect between the American and Black identities, paired with Blacks’ strong
identification with their racial identity (Crocker et al., 1994), support the prediction that Black
Americans should be able to shift between their national and racial identities – not only because
of the inherent mobility between the two identities, but also because the Black racial identity
appears to provide a quality alternative with which one can strongly identify and from which one
can derive plenty of self-esteem (Crocker et al., 1994).
In contrast, given Devos & Banaji’s (2005) pervasive “American = White” finding, we
conjecture that because the two identities are apparently cognitively synonymous, White
Americans may not be able to shift between their national and racial identities. As such, if a
White American is exposed to a currently threatening American identity, the White racial
identity may not be able to provide a convenient escape. (An alternative, but consistent,
speculation is that Whites may be hesitant to highlight their racial identity as it may be deemed
socially inappropriate to cite the White identity as an important aspect of the self; see
Frankenberg, 1993; Swain, 2002). Moreover, although we acknowledge the strong association
between “White” and “American” for Whites, and that it might be difficult to tear these two
apart if one goes under fire, we also realize that even if White Americans were able to break this
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link, they might not be able to turn to the White identity for refuge. Important research by Wong
and Cho (2005) indicates that White racial identification over the period of 1972 to 2000 has
been stable and relatively low. Only half of White respondents in their analyses “felt close to
Whites,” whereas a substantial 83% of Black Americans “felt close to Blacks” (Wong & Cho,
2005). Additional analyses revealed that racial identity is also less central for Whites than it is
for Blacks; from 1972 to 1992, 34% of Black respondents reported that they felt closest to the
“Black” social group, whereas only 4% of Whites reported that they felt closest to the “White”
social group (Wong & Cho, 2005).
As more of an aside, but no less relevant to our discussion of a differential shift in social
identity for Black and White Americans, we also expect a difference in the racial groups’ ability
or willingness to explain away a currently threatening American identity. As will be further
explained below in the context of Study 1, Blacks and Whites will each be exposed to a
threatening American identity that derives its negative affect from the Iraq War, non-Americans’
perceptions of the United States’ involvement in this war, and the general disapproval of
President George W. Bush during this time (data was collected in 2007). Although Black and
White Americans should experience this threat to the same degree (after all, both groups are
American), we expect differences in how the two racial groups will make attributions for
America’s involvement in the War.
That is, because White Americans are perceived as “owning” the nation (Sidanius &
Pratto, 1999) and therefore having the most influence over national politics, they should want to
“explain away” the War with more external attributions (or, at the very least, they will be less
likely, relative to Blacks, to endorse internal attributions). According to CNN.com’s national exit
polls for the 2004 Presidential Election, more Whites voted for President Bush (58%) than for
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Senator Kerry (41%), whereas the reverse was true for Blacks (only 11% of Blacks voted for
President Bush, whereas 88% voted for Senator Kerry) (CNN.com, Nov. 2, 2004). As for the
War, according to major polls cited by The Boston Globe’s Derrick Jackson, before the 2003
invasion of Iraq, Black support for the invasion was as low as 19%, whereas White support ran
between 58% and 73%. In 2007 (the same year in which our data was collected), 85% of Black
Americans called the War a mistake, compared to only 53% of White Americans (Jackson,
2007). These paired findings, that Whites put President Bush back in office in 2004 and were
more likely (compared to Blacks) to support the War, even after it had arguably proven to be a
lost cause, support the contention that Whites may need to make more external attributions for
America’s involvement in Iraq; Blacks, in contrast, should have little hesitancy in making
internal attributions for the War and blaming the United States for its involvement. These
different patterns of attributional reasoning should lend some insight into why Blacks may be
able to shift between their national and racial identities (i.e., they find the War particularly
shameful because they believe the United States is to blame), and why Whites may not have any
need to do so (i.e., the War can be explained away).
Study 1 seeks to address three hypotheses generated from the discussion above. The first
and second hypotheses serve to explain and provide context for a social identity shift, whereas
the third hypothesis is most primary to our uncovering of a social identity shift.
Hypothesis 1. As just mentioned, one reason why White Americans may not need to shift
between their national and racial identities may have to do with their ability to explain away the
War; for Black Americans, however, if they consider the United States to be blameworthy, then a
shift could be more likely. We therefore hypothesize that, regardless of condition, Black
Americans will endorse more internal attributions for the War, compared to White Americans.
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Hypothesis 2. Another reason why White Americans may not be able to shift from the
American identity to the White identity, and why Black Americans should be able to shift from
the American identity to the Black identity, might have to do with the varying levels of
identification with the national and racial identities for the two groups. As alluded to in the above
discussion, we hypothesize the following, regardless of condition: a) White Americans will more
strongly identify with their American identity than with their White identity, as racial
identification by a dominant racial group is typically low due to race being less salient (Gurin,
1985) and perhaps considered an inappropriate source of pride (Swain, 2002); and b) Black
Americans will more strongly identify with their Black identity than with their American
identity, both because the Black identity is salient and central (Crocker et al., 1994) and because
the American identity often provides them with a conflicting sense of membership (Barlow et al.,
2000).
Hypothesis 3. In line with Mussweiler’s et al. (2000) conceptualization of a social
identity shift, defined as a sort of relative emphasis of one identity over another, such that while
one social identity is deemphasized and potentially even devalued, a different social identity is
simultaneously emphasized and perhaps valued more, we decided to use value-indicative
measures to assess which social identity was currently providing the best source of positive self-
regard. In effect then, for the purposes of this research, a social identity shift refers to the relative
valuation of one social identity over another that is contextually bound and in response to some
event. We chose to use two of the subscales of Luhtanen and Crocker’s (1992) Collective Self-
Esteem Scale3 as the medium by which to express this relative valuation.
                                                 
3 Collective self-esteem is defined as the overall value placed upon one’s social groups
(Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992).
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According to these researchers, each social group to which one belongs has an associated,
subjective level of collective self-esteem that can be derived from multiple sources; for the
purposes of this paper, we will focus solely on public collective self-esteem, one’s judgments of
how other people evaluate one’s social group, and private collective self-esteem, one’s personal
judgment as to the value of one’s social group. Following from Luhtanen and Crocker’s (1992)
suggestion that “one type of self-esteem may at times compensate for another” (p. 304), we
believe that in an effort to maintain an overall high level of positive social identity, individuals
may need to vary the amount of collective self-esteem currently derived from their different
social groups (and even the different types within each group). Looking at how much collective
self-esteem each social group is currently providing the individual should give us insight into
how the individual is sustaining an overall level of positive social identity.
We therefore predict the following patterns of collective self-esteem movement in Study
1: In the face of a threatening American social identity in which the threat is defined as the
experience of disapproval from non-Americans, a) public American collective self-esteem for
both Black and White Americans should drop, compared to the control condition; b) public
racial collective self-esteem should be unaffected for both Black and White Americans compared
to the control condition, as how others perceive one’s racial identity is neither directly nor
explicitly implicated by a threatening American identity; and c) for Black Americans, the relative
valuation of the private racial identity over the private American identity should increase, such
that the difference between private American collective self-esteem and private racial collective
self-esteem will be greater, compared to the control condition; for White Americans, the relative
valuation of the private racial identity over the private American identity should be the same as
that in the control condition. This third predicted pattern for Black Americans should be the
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result of a social identity shift; that is, whereas White Americans cannot increase the private
value derived from the racial identity (over the private value derived from the American identity)
in this situation because “American = White” and the two identities are inextricably bound up,
Black Americans should be able to momentarily enhance the degree of collective self-esteem
derived from the racial identity (over the American identity) and use it as a buffer against the
currently failing American identity.
2.4 Differential Shifting of a Racially Ambiguous American Target
Following the logic of self-categorization theory (Turner, 1982, 1984; Turner, et al.,
1987; Turner et al., 1994), the social identity of a targeted other should also be contextually
bound and motivationally driven. Findings from research on stereotyping help to substantiate this
claim. For instance, Sinclair and Kunda (1999) argue that motivation may promote stereotype
activation and stereotype inhibition related to social groups and that people who are motivated to
form a specific impression of another person may pick and choose among the many stereotypes
applicable to that person. In one study, these researchers showed that in response to criticism
from a Black doctor, participants inhibited the “competent” doctor stereotype and activated the
“incompetent” Black stereotype. In contrast, even those participants high in prejudice who were
motivated to esteem the Black doctor (because he had praised them) inhibited the negative Black
stereotype in favor of the positive doctor stereotype to characterize the target (Sinclair & Kunda,
1999). Given these findings, it appears that self-protective goals may in fact determine how
another person is categorized.
More recent research in line with our general theme concerning the social identities of
nationality and race further suggests the malleability of the social membership of a target.
Results from a series of studies showed that White Americans were more likely to include Black
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Americans in the superordinate American group via an implicit association test (IAT), thereby
reducing the “American = White” effect (Devos & Banaji, 2005), after they were subliminally
primed with positive stereotypic information about Black Americans (Rydell, Hamilton, &
Devos, 2010). Conversely, the American = White effect was actually enhanced (i.e., Blacks were
excluded from the American category) when negative stereotypic information about Black
Americans was made accessible. Changes in the valence of Black American exemplars also led
to changes in the American = White effect, such that when positive Black American exemplars
were made salient, the American = White effect was reduced (i.e., Black Americans were
included in the American category), relative to when negative Black American exemplars were
presented (Rydell et al., 2010).
Apparently, a subgroup is more likely to be included into the category “American” by the
dominant group when it is perceived positively, but will be excluded from the same category if it
is depicted negatively. These abovementioned findings are aligned with past theory that suggests
that people are more wiling to include others into self-relevant social categories when they
possess positive qualities (Leyens & Yzerbyt, 1992), and are more likely to exclude group
members when they possess negative qualities (Eidelman, Silvia, & Biernat, 2006). The
reasoning behind both the inclusion of currently positive in-group members and the exclusion of
currently negative in-group members is motivational; that is, including or excluding these
individuals is a method by which the perceiver can either increase or maintain in-group status
(Snyder, Lassegard, & Ford, 1986), as well as the self-esteem he or she derives from that social
category (Tajfel & Turner, 1986).
Following this logic, we set out to test in Study 2 whether Black and White Americans
who share the American identity with a racially ambiguous (i.e., biracial) target will
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differentially shift the racial identity of that target in response to the target’s affiliation with a
currently threatening American identity. Though shared affiliation in one social group
(American) may be inflexible, perhaps mobilizing the target away from one’s other (racial)
social group will create the distance necessary to be able to preserve a positive self-image
derived from social identity. Specifically, using President Barack Obama as this racially
ambiguous target provides the ideal context for analysis of this potential social identity shift.
Given that it is an undeniable fact that President Obama is a member of the American social
group – he is, after all, the President of the United States – neither Black nor White Americans
should be able to shift him out of the American social category. However, because he is biracial,
his racial category membership is ambiguous and whether Blacks or Whites deem him as (more
or less) “Black” or (more or less) “White” could be a matter of context. The context we provide
in Study 2, to be discussed, is not arbitrary. We will expose participants to a currently
threatening American identity, but importantly, the threat will be derived from the actions,
policies, themes, and general consequences of President Obama’s Administration. In effect then,
President Obama is not only American; for the purposes of this study, he is also currently the
source of the threatening American identity.
Initially, we might conjecture that in response to a politically threatening American
identity of which President Obama is the source, Black and White Americans would each engage
in target-shifting of President Obama; that is, Blacks should shift him out of the Black racial
social category and make him “Whiter,” whereas Whites should shift him out of the White racial
social category and make him “Blacker.” However, due to a somewhat ironic effect related to the
principle of hypodescent (Banks & Eberhardt, 1998) and the construct of White American
20
Centrism (Dach-Grushow, 2006), we believe the two racial groups will not follow similar target-
shifting trajectories.
In the United States, perception and treatment of biracial Americans (Black-White
individuals in particular) has historically been governed by the rule of hypodescent, otherwise
known as the “one-drop” rule, in which individuals of mixed-race ancestry are assigned the
status of the minority or socially subordinate group in their lineage (Banks & Eberhardt, 1998).
Although the “rule” sounds archaic, recent research by Peery and Bodenhausen (2008) suggests
that this perception has yet to meet its end; when under time pressure, the majority of their
participants classified racially ambiguous targets as “Black,” even though the targets exhibited
biological traits and cultural backgrounds stereotypically consistent with both racial
classifications. This research serves to substantiate the idea that social categorization is often
driven by what is salient in the environment, and minority features are inherently salient due to
when and how people learn to characterize majority and minority categories (for an example, see
Nosofsky, 1986).
New research by Ho, Sidanius, Levin, and Banaji (2011) is perhaps the most
comprehensive look into the rule of hypodescent and its effects on the categorization of Black-
White individuals to date. Surprisingly, even on a explicit question-and-answer survey in which
they were presented with the exact specifications of a target’s racial composition, both White and
minority group participants categorized half-Black/half-White targets are relatively more
minority than White. Using a depiction of the target’s family tree as the prompt, Ho et al. (2011)
found further evidence of hypodescent at a more implicit level, using a speeded response task –
and to a greater magnitude than what they found from their survey data. Most interestingly, using
a face-morphing task, these same researchers found that there was a lower threshold required for
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being perceived as “Black” than there was for being perceived as “White.” In other words, the
target needed to be a lower percentage Black to be categorized as “Black” than that same target
needed to be percentage White to be categorized as “White.”
Even with regards to President Obama specifically, it appears that the rule of hypodescent
makes no exceptions. A recent paper published in Psychological Science uses the title “Why
Barack Obama is Black: A Cognitive Account of Hypodescent” to springboard its discussion of
the one-drop rule, implying that due to basic cognitive processes of learning and categorization,
not even President Obama is protected against it (Halberstadt, Sherman, & Sherman, 2010).
Obama himself, in many contexts, including his first memoir Dreams From My Father (1995),
an account of his difficult journey of self discovery and a reflection of his own experiences with
race and race relations in the United States, has self-identified as African-American. He has
professed quite openly, “I identify as African-American – that’s how I’m treated and that’s how
I’m viewed. I’m proud of it” (“Obama’s true colors: Black, white … or neither?” Dec. 14, 2008).
According to the White House, President Obama did not check multiple boxes on his 2010 U.S.
Census form, nor did he choose the option that allowed him to elaborate on his racial heritage –
instead, he ticked the box that said “Black, African Am., or Negro” (“It’s official: Obama is
black,” Apr. 3, 2010). Interestingly, although others will dispute that Obama is “just Black” and
instead prefer to label him as “biracial” (Arana, 2008), we are hard-pressed to find a single piece
of media that labels him as “just White.” During various stages of the presidential campaign,
some commentators – both Black and White – questioned whether Obama was “too Black” while
others claimed that he was “not Black enough” (Obama, 2008; Walters, 2007). No one
questioned whether he was “too White,” and no one claimed that he was “not White enough.”
For all practical purposes, President Obama views himself and is viewed by the American public
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as Black; if the “biracial” label is ever used in place of the “Black” label to refer to him,
Americans are aware of its euphemistic quality and that no matter how accurate the “biracial”
term may be in defining Obama, his White identity remains the less salient half.
If the general public sees President Obama as “mostly Black” via the rule of hypodescent,
then in the event that President Obama flounders or somehow disgraces the American identity,
White Americans remain protected. After all, President Obama may share the American identity
with White Americans, but because he is Black, he is thereby distinct from them and this racial
discrepancy may provide some degree of solace – at least enough to buffer Whites against the
threat and allow them to resist making him “Blacker”. In contrast, and by the very same rule,
Black Americans ostensibly share both their national and racial identities with the President and
in the event that President Obama becomes negatively affiliated with the American identity,
Blacks may have to emphasize his biracial identity by making him “Whiter.” In the words of
comedian Wanda Sykes at a 2009 dinner of the White House Correspondents’ Association, “The
first Black president! I’m proud to be able to say that. That’s unless you screw up. And then it’s
going to be, ‘What’s up with the half-White guy?’” (“It’s official: Obama is black,” Apr. 3,
2010).
Importantly, we do not expect these differential patterns to occur without qualification.
Returning to our discussion of “American = White” (Devos & Banaji, 2005; henceforth
operationalized by the White American Centrism scale; Dach-Grushow, 2006), that the
American identity is inextricably bound up with the White identity such that the two become
synonymous, we believe that this push to make President Obama “Whiter” for Blacks in a
threatening situation should be contingent upon their level of White American Centrism. That is,
for those Black Americans who are more apt to endorse White American Centrism (i.e.,
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American = White), when President Obama is currently the source of a negative American
image, such that American = Barack Obama, then via a sort of transitive property, Barack
Obama = White. For these Black Americans who endorse White American Centrism, as long as
President Obama’s racial identity is shifted away from their own, toward the White identity, then
he merely represents standard White American government that in no way should implicate the
Black identity in a threatening situation.
Hypothesis 4. Study 2 seeks to address a three-part hypothesis generated from the
discussion above. Regarding a shift in President Obama’s racial identity, a) in response to a
currently threatening American identity of which President Obama and his Administration serve
as the source, Black Americans who endorse White American Centrism should perceive
President Obama’s skin color to be physically “Whiter,” compared to Black Americans who do
not endorse White American Centrism; b) in response to this same currently threatening
American identity, there should be no effect of endorsement of White American Centrism on the
perception of President Obama’s skin color for White Americans; and c) in the control condition,
neither Blacks nor Whites should differentially categorize President Obama’s skin color
depending upon their levels of White American Centrism.
Chapter 3 will address the topic of self-shifting (Study 1) and Hypotheses 1 through 3.
Chapter 4 will focus on the topic of target-shifting (Study 2) and Hypothesis 4.
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CHAPTER 3: STUDY 1 SELF-SHIFTING
Study 1 set out to test whether Black and White Americans are capable of strategically
engaging in a social identity self-shift across the identities of nationality and race. Specifically,
we questioned whether, in response to a currently threatening American identity, Black and
White Americans would be able to momentarily deemphasize or devalue their American identity
and shift toward their racial identity as a way to replace or compensate for the general loss of
self-esteem previously derived from the national identity. We expected that this process would
be differentially experienced by the two racial groups given the varying degrees of perceived
association between the American identity and each of the racial identities, as well as the two
groups’ dissimilar levels of identification with both the national and racial identities and their
respective degrees of ability to explain away the currently threatening American identity.
Importantly, up until this point, we have not defined what we mean by a “threatening”
American social identity. As this data was collected in 2007, during President Bush’s
Administration and the height of the U.S. troop surge in Iraq, we decided to capitalize on the
current social milieu of general disapproval – both domestically and abroad – of the Iraq War,
the United States’ involvement in the War, and the nation’s President. We decided to use the
emotion of vicarious shame as the medium by which to carry this message. According to Lickel,
Schmader, Curtis, Scarnier, and Ames (2005), the experience of vicarious shame (versus that of
vicarious guilt) is characterized by the relevance of the event to a shared social identity with the
wrongdoer (for our purposes, the identity is American and the wrongdoer is the Bush
Administration), an appraisal of self-image threat, and a motivation to distance from the event.
This motive to distance was deemed essential to catalyzing a shift away from the American
identity.
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3.1 Participants
Fifty-one Black American undergraduates (71% female; average age = 19.80, SD = 1.83;
83% Democrat, 2% Republican) from a public university in the Midwestern United States and 92
White American undergraduates (55% female; average age = 19.08, SD = 1.14; 35% Democrat,
33% Republican) from the same university were recruited to participate in the study. The
students participated voluntarily for course credit. All participants self-identified as both
American and as a member of their racial group in a prescreening questionnaire and also
indicated their birth country and race on a demographics form following completion of the study.
During the study, Black participants were solely exposed to a Black experimenter, whereas
White participants were exposed to a White experimenter, in an effort to encourage participants
to express their feelings and attitudes openly and honestly.
3.2 Vicarious Shame Induction
In the present study, as a means of instilling feeling of vicarious shame, participants were
first told that they would be participating in a study designed to examine how students make
sense of the experiences of others. All participants read a mock letter home from an American
exchange student studying abroad in the Netherlands and were told to imagine themselves in the
student’s shoes while reading, to experience the feelings that the student expressed in the letter,
and to submerge themselves in the student’s described situation. In the experimental condition,
participants read a letter in which the American exchange student describes a heated classroom
debate in which the United States and President Bush are severely criticized for the involvement
in Iraq and the most recent Iraq War4. The student ends the letter by admitting, “I just wanted to
                                                 
4 In a short pilot study conducted early in 2007, 30 undergraduates (60% female; average age =
20.56, SD = 1.24) from the same university were asked to list what they believed Americans find
shameful in their culture. The most frequently listed responses concerned the war in Iraq,
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hide, conceal my ‘Americanness,’ and I know that the other Americans next to me felt the exact
same way. In fact, and I hate to admit this… but that night I went home and pinned a Canadian
flag onto my backpack!” In the control condition, the letter describes a classroom debate about
the true identity of the sitter for Leonardo da Vinci’s Mona Lisa. See Appendix A for each letter
used in the experimental and control conditions.
3.3 Measures
3.3.1 Public Collective Self-Esteem
According to Luhtanen and Crocker (1992) in their seminal paper on a collective self-
esteem scale by which to measure individuals’ self-evaluations of their social identities, public
collective self-esteem concerns one’s judgments of how other people evaluate the social groups
to which he or she belongs. Both Black and White Americans responded to two sets of four
public collective self-esteem items directly modified from Luhtanen and Crocker’s (1992)
original public collective self-esteem subscale; the first set concerned participants’ American
identity and the second set concerned their racial identity. Importantly, we allowed participants
to indicate their own racial group membership on the racial collective self-esteem measure to
allow for their subjective terminology (e.g., Black versus African American). On a scale of 1
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree), participants indicated their level of agreement with
statements such as, “Overall, Americans [Blacks/Whites] are considered good by others” and “In
general, others think that Americans [Blacks/Whites] are unworthy” (reverse-scored). Higher
scores on the composite four-item measure per type of identity indicated a stronger degree of
public collective self-esteem for that identity. Internal reliability of the public collective self-
esteem measure for the American identity was moderate for Blacks (α = .66), but was higher for
                                                                                                                                                              
President Bush, and government; over half of respondents included a response indicating that
shame was felt most when Americans were physically located outside of the United States.
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Whites (α = .70). Similarly, internal reliability of the public collective self-esteem measure for
the racial identity was moderate for Blacks (α = .52), but strong for Whites (α = .79). See
Appendix A for the complete version of both the American and racial public collective self-
esteem measures.
3.3.2 Private Collective Self-Esteem
Private collective self-esteem refers to one’s personal judgments regarding the worth of
his or her social groups (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992). As described above, both Black and White
Americans responded to two sets of four private collective self-esteem items directly modified
from Luhtanen and Crocker’s (1992) original subscale; the first set concerned participants’
American identity and the second set concerned their racial identity. The private collective self-
esteem items for the American identity were intermixed with the public collective self-esteem
items for the American identity; likewise, the private and public collective self-esteem items for
the racial identity were also presented together, as one ostensible measure. As before, we
allowed participants to indicate their own racial group membership on the racial collective self-
esteem measure to allow for their self-descriptive terminology. On a scale of 1 (strongly
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree), participants indicated their level of agreement with statements
such as, “I feel good about being an American [Black/White]” and “I often regret that I am
American [Black/White]” (reverse-scored). Higher scores on the composite four-item measure
per type of identity indicated a stronger degree of private collective self-esteem for that identity.
Internal reliability of the private collective self-esteem measure for the American identity was
high for both Blacks (α = .81) and Whites (α = .86). Similarly, internal reliability of the private
collective self-esteem measure for the racial identity was high for both Blacks (α = .75) and
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Whites (α = .80). See Appendix A for the complete version of both the American and racial
private collective self-esteem measures.
3.3.3 Identification5
Both American and racial identification were assessed for Black and White participants
following completion of the American and racial collective self-esteem measures, respectively.
On a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree), participants indicated their level of
agreement with the statement, “I strongly identify with the American [Black/White] culture.”
3.3.4 Attributional Reasoning for the War
To examine participants’ understanding of the Iraq War and their opinions on the United
States’ involvement in it, we asked four questions regarding their attributional reasoning about
the War. Participants in both the experimental and control conditions first read the following:
“Frequently, the news and other forms of media highlight criticism about the Iraq War and the
United States’ involvement in this war.” Then, on a scale of 1 (absolutely not/not at all) to 6
(absolutely yes/very much), participants indicated their answers to the following four questions:
“Is this criticism valid?” “Does America deserve the blame?” “Are other nations being unfair in
blaming America?” (reverse-scored), and “To what extent do you think America should be
responsible for the criticism?” Higher scores on the composite four-item measure of attributional
reasoning indicated stronger endorsement of the United States being blameworthy for its
involvement in the War. Internal reliability for the measure was high for both Blacks (α = .78)
and Whites (α = .83).
                                                 
5 These items (one for the American identity and one for the racial identity) were substituted for
the Identity subscale of Luhtanen & Crocker’s (1992) Collective Self-Esteem Scale in an effort
to be more parsimonious and direct. Additionally, the Identity subscale (used in Mussweiler et
al., 2000) has been shown to be correlated highly with the Private subscale, which was included
in our measures (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992).
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3.4 Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to either the experimental or control condition. Both
groups of participants were told that they would be engaging in a study on perspective-taking
and memory and that they would have three minutes to read a letter home from an American
exchange student studying abroad in the Netherlands and to sufficiently submerge themselves in
the role of this student. Participants were also told that once these three minutes expired, they
would work on another package of materials as a filler task and that once they had completed
these questionnaires, they would be asked to recall two main points from the letter and then
complete a few more tasks. During the “filler task” phase of the experiment, participants
completed the public and private collective self-esteem measures as well as the identification
measure. All participants were presented with the American questionnaire first, followed by the
racial questionnaire6. Upon completion of these questionnaires, participants then spent a few
moments writing down two main points from the letter. After this short “recall task,” participants
then responded to the four attribution questions, answered a demographic page (including their
political views and affiliations), and were debriefed.
3.5 Results and Discussion
3.5.1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics and correlations of the major variables in this
study for both the Black and White samples.
3.5.2 Attributional Reasoning for the War
Recall that we predicted in Hypothesis 1 that Black Americans would be more likely to
endorse internal attributions for the United States’ involvement in the Iraq War, relative to White
                                                 
6 The American and racial questionnaires were not counterbalanced. Previous studies conducted
in which these same two questionnaires were counterbalanced showed no effect of order.
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Americans, and that this effect would be found consistently within both conditions. To test this
prediction, we performed a Race (Black vs. White) X Condition (shame vs. control) univariate
ANOVA on the attributional reasoning scores. In line with our hypothesis, a significant main
effect of Race was found, F(1, 139) = 4.40, p < .05, ηp2 = .03, such that averaged across both
conditions, Black Americans indicated greater endorsement of the attribution items, that the
United States is deserving of blame for its involvement in the Iraq War (M = 4.06, SD = .90),
than did White Americans (M = 3.72, SD = .98). There was no interaction or a main effect of
Condition, which was in line with our prediction that, regardless of whether participants were
shamed, Blacks should be more likely than Whites to attribute the War to some American
wrongdoing.
3.5.3 Identification
Recall that we predicted in Hypothesis 2 that, regardless of condition: a) White
Americans would more strongly identify with their American identity than with their White
identity; and b) Black Americans would more strongly identify with their Black identity than
with their American identity. To test these predictions, we performed a Race (Black vs. White) X
Condition (shame vs. control) X Identity (American vs. racial) repeated measures ANOVA with
Identity as the repeated measure on the participants’ identification scores.
The results revealed a significant Race X Identity interaction, F(1, 137) = 23.74, p < .001,
ηp
2 = .15 (see Figure 1). To unpack this interaction, Black Americans more strongly identified
with their racial identity (M = 5.78, SD = 1.40) than with their American identity (M = 5.20, SD
= 1.34), t(50) = -2.25, p < .05, whereas the reverse was found to be true for White Americans,
such that they more strongly identified with their American identity (M = 5.55, SD = 1.19) than
with their racial identity (M = 4.54, SD = 1.84), t(89) = 5.00, p < .01, as was predicted.
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Additionally, whereas Black and White Americans significantly differed in their racial
identification, t(140) = -4.20, p < .001, as would be expected due to issues of salience (Gurin,
1985; Crocker et al., 1994) and social desirability (Swain, 2002), Black and White Americans
identified equally with their American identity, t(140) = 1.62, ns. A main effect of Race was
found, F(1, 137) = 5.29,  p < .05, ηp2 = 04, driven mainly by Blacks’ high racial identification,
and no other interactions or main effects were found to be significant.
3.5.4 Collective Self-Esteem Shift
Recall that we predicted the following patterns in Hypothesis 3: In response to a
threatening American social identity, a) public American collective self-esteem for both Black
and White Americans should drop, compared to the control condition; b) public racial collective
self-esteem should be unaffected for both Black and White Americans, compared to the control
condition; and c) for Black Americans, the relative valuation of the private racial identity over
the private American identity should increase, such that the difference between private American
collective self-esteem and private racial collective self-esteem will be greater, compared to the
control condition; for White Americans, the relative valuation of the private racial identity over
the private American identity should be the same as that in the control condition.
To test these predictions, we performed a Race (Black vs. White) X Condition (shame vs.
control) X Identity (American vs. racial) X Public_private (public vs. private) repeated measures
ANOVA with the last two factors as the repeated measures on the participants’ collective self-
esteem scores. A significant four-way interaction was found, F(1, 137) = 4.52, p < .05, ηp2 = .03.
To understand this interaction further, we performed a Race X Condition univariate ANOVA on
each of the four types of collective self-esteem. Figure 2 graphically presents the results for each
of the four types of collective self-esteem.
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With regards to public American collective self-esteem, a main effect of Condition was
found, F(1, 138) = 12.19, p < .001, ηp2 = .08, such that both Blacks and Whites indicated
significantly more public American collective-esteem in the control condition (M = 4.38, SD =
.82 for Blacks, and M = 4.58, SD = .98 for Whites) than in the shame condition (M = 3.77, SD =
1.16 for Blacks, and M = 3.93, SD = 1.02 for Whites). This result suggests that our manipulation
was effective, such that in response to experiencing vicarious shame in the American identity,
public American collective self-esteem was indeed lowered. Neither an interaction nor a main
effect of Race was found to be significant.
Concerning public racial collective self-esteem, a main effect of Race was found, F(1,
138) = 116.79, p < .001, ηp2 = .46, such that averaged across conditions, Whites (M = 5.25, SD =
.97 in the control condition, and M = 5.14, SD = .95 in the shame condition) indicated
significantly higher levels of public racial collective self-esteem than did Blacks (M = 3.58, SD =
.83 in the control condition, and M = 3.31, SD = .80 in the shame condition). This finding is
consistent with past literature (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992), that Whites understand their racial
identity to be more highly regarded by others, compared to Blacks. Neither an interaction nor a
main effect of Condition was significant.
As for private American collective self-esteem, a main effect of Race was found, F(1,
138) = 11.82, p < .001, ηp2 = .08, such that averaged across conditions, Whites (M = 6.02, SD =
.82 in the control condition, and M = 5.98, SD = .98 in the shame condition) indicated
significantly more private American collective self-esteem than did Blacks (M = 5.46, SD = 1.13
in the control condition, and M = 5.30, SD = 1.23 in the shame condition). We suggest that this
finding may have its roots in the “American = White” effect (Devos & Banaji, 2005), such that
Whites can derive more personal value from their American identity, compared to Blacks,
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because they are more consistently associated with it. Neither an interaction nor a main effect of
Condition was found to be significant.
Regarding private racial collective self-esteem, we found both a main effect of Race, F(1,
138) = 7.00, p < .01, ηp2 = .05, and a main effect of Condition, F(1, 138) = 4.51, p < .05, ηp2 =
.03. The effect of Race indicates that averaged across conditions, Blacks (M = 6.08, SD = 1.03 in
the control condition, and M = 6.65, SD = .62 in the shame condition) consistently reported
greater private racial collective self-esteem than did Whites (M = 5.96, SD = .84 in the control
condition, M = 6.00, SD = .77 in the shame condition). The effect of Condition suggests that
regardless of race, those in the shame condition indicated higher levels of private racial
collective self-esteem relative to those in the control condition. However, these two main effects
were further qualified by a marginally significant interaction, F(1, 138) = 3.42, p = .06, ηp2 = .02,
driven by Blacks’ high levels of private racial collective self-esteem in the shame condition.
Pairwise comparisons reveal two important findings: 1) In the shame condition, Blacks have
marginally higher private racial collective self-esteem than do Whites, t(69) = -3.80, p = .07, but
this difference between the two groups is absent in the control condition, t(69) = -.49, ns, and 2)
More interestingly and relevant to the idea of a social identity shift, whereas Whites in the
control and shame conditions do not differ with regards to their levels of private racial collective
self-esteem, t(89) = -.23, ns, Blacks in the shame condition have significantly higher private
racial collective self-esteem than do Blacks in the control condition, t(49) = -2.48, p < .01.
Most crucial to the idea of a social identity shift, Hypothesis 3c did not focus on the
separate effects of private American collective self-esteem and private racial collective self-
esteem (though we considered it necessary to include these analyses to be comprehensive), but
rather the relative valuation of one type of private collective self-esteem over the other. In effect,
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a true social identity shift implies a devaluation of one identity and a simultaneous enhancement
of a different social identity. To determine the presence of such a shift, we calculated the
differences between the two types of private collective self-esteem for both racial groups, in both
conditions. These differences (private racial collective self-esteem less private American
collective self-esteem) are presented graphically for Blacks in Figure 3, and for Whites in Figure
4. For Black Americans, although this difference was significant in both the shame condition,
t(30) = 6.34, p < .001, and the control condition, t(19) = 2.74, p < .05, the difference between
these difference scores was significant, t(49) = -2.294, p < .05, such that Blacks in the shame
condition expressed greater private racial collective self-esteem than private American collective
self-esteem, compared to Blacks in the control condition. For White Americans, not only were
neither of the individual condition differences between private racial collective self-esteem and
private American collective self-esteem significant (t(39) = .845, ns, for the shame condition,
and t(49) = -.483, ns, for the control condition), but the difference between these difference
scores was also not significant, t(88) = -.18, ns, such that Whites in both conditions expressed
similar (near negligible) discrepancies between their private racial collective self-esteem and
private American collective self-esteem.
Taking these findings together, we deduce that Black Americans experience a social
identity shift across race and nationality (operationalized as a relative valuation of private racial
collective self-esteem over private American collective self-esteem) in response to a currently
threatening American identity, whereas White Americans do not, partly due to the two groups’
dissimilar levels of identification with the two identities as well as the differences in their
attributional reasoning for the Iraq War. That is, because Black Americans are more identified
with their Black identity than with their American identity, whereas White Americans are more
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identified with their American identity than with their White identity, Black Americans seem to
be more able to detach from their American identity and move toward their racial identity as a
quality alternative. Further, that White Americans are less likely to endorse internal attributions
regarding the Iraq War (that the United States is blameworthy), compared to Black Americans,
provides additional support for a differential shift effect. Apparently, although White Americans
may not need to shift between their national and racial identities because they can explain away
the War, Black Americans, who consider the United States to be more blameworthy, should feel
pressure to move away from the American identity. Additionally, the “American = White”
phenomenon (Devos & Banaji, 2005) is foundational to our argument, and though we did not
explicitly test for the effect in this study, we believe that the social identity shift process may be
differentially experienced by the two racial groups because of the varying degrees of perceived
association between the American identity and each of the racial identities. In short, if the
American identity is more bound to the White racial identity than to other racial identities, then
although Whites may be immobile in shifting between the two, Blacks have a convenient escape
(to the Black identity) when the American identity is currently faltering.
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CHAPTER 4: STUDY 2 TARGET-SHIFTING
Study 2’s primary goal was to extend the presence of a social identity shift across
nationality and race to the concept of target-shifting. Using President Obama as our racially
ambiguous American in-group member, we set out to test whether Black and White Americans
would differentially categorize the President’s race in the context of a threatening American
identity of which he was the source. We conjectured that White Americans high and low in
White American Centrism (Dach-Grushow, 2006) would not differ in their categorization of
President Obama in either the control or threat condition. In contrast, we expected that, in
response to threat, Black Americans who endorsed White American Centrism would classify the
President as “Whiter,” compared to those Black Americans who did not endorse White American
Centrism. We did not, however, expect this differential effect of White American Centrism for
Black Americans in the control condition.
Unlike in Study 1, the goal here was not to personally shift the participant away from any
particular social identity; for this reason, we decided against using vicarious shame as our
medium for threat. Instead, acknowledging the need to materialize some degree of negative
affect related to the American identity and President Obama, we used a stimulus (to be described
below) that associated President Obama with arguably negative characteristics assigned to his
Administration by both the American and international media.
4.1 Pilot Study on White American Centrism
In the spring of 2009, a few months following the election of President Obama, we pilot
tested a new measure entitled White American Centrism (WAC) originally conceptualized by
Dach-Gruschow (2006). The 13-item measure is intended to be used to test the implicit
assumption that “American = White” (Devos & Banaji, 2005), the idea that American national
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identity is racially essentialized, having a racial “essence” that is biological, deterministic in its
associated traits, and immutable (Haslam, Bastian, Bain, & Kashima, 2006). On a scale of 1
(strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree), participants indicated their level of agreement with
statements such as, “I usually assume the term Americans refers to White Americans” and
“Ethnicity has no bearing on whether one can be called American” (reverse-scored). Higher
scores on the composite measure indicated stronger endorsement of White American Centrism.
Fifty-seven White Americans (58% female; average age = 19.40, SD = 1.18), unexposed
to any manipulation, responded to a battery of questionnaires including our White American
Centrism measure (α = .82), the 19-item Protestant Work Ethic measure (Mirels & Garrett,
1971) (α = .76), the eight-item Lay Theory of Race measure (No, Hong, Liao, Lee, Wood, &
Chao, 2008) (α = .84), and the eight-item Symbolic Racism 2000 measure (Henry & Sears,
2002) (α = .86), among other filler questionnaires. See Appendix A for complete versions of
each of these four measures.
Composite White American Centrism scores significantly correlate with each of the three
other measures, r(57) = .31, p < .05 with Protestant Work Ethic, r(57) = .41, p < .01 with Lay
Theory of Race, and r(57) = .32, p < .05 with Symbolic Racism 2000. (Although Lay Theory of
Race and Symbolic Racism 2000 correlate with each other significantly, r(57) = .27, p < .05,
Protestant Work Ethic does not significantly correlate with either of the other two measures.) Of
the 57 respondents, 36 voted in the 2008 Presidential Election (26 voted for President Obama
and 10 voted for Senator McCain) and 21 respondents did not vote (some of whom were
underage at the time of the election). Predictably, the WAC scores of those who voted for
President Obama (M = 2.38, SD = .63) were significantly lower than the WAC scores of the
respondents who voted for Senator McCain (M = 3.03, SD = 1.11), t(34) = -2.21, p < .05. There
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were no significant differences between those who did not vote (M = 2.58, SD = .85) and either
the Obama or McCain voters, t(45) = -.90, ns and t(29) = 1.25, ns, respectively.
4.2 Main Study: Participants
53 Black American undergraduates from a public university in the Midwestern United
States and 135 White American undergraduates from the same university were recruited to
participate in the study. All outliers (those who scored at either 2.5 standard deviations above or
below the mean of the main measures within this study) were removed; as a result, only 46 Black
Americans (65% female; average age = 19.56, SD = 1.24; 85% Democrat, 0% Republican) and
129 White Americans (53% female; average age = 19.31, SD = 1.02; 35% Democrat, 28%
Republican) were used in the analyses.
None of these participants had participated in Study 1 or in the pilot study on White
American Centrism. The students participated voluntarily for course credit. All participants self-
identified as both American and as a member of their racial group in a prescreening
questionnaire and also indicated their birth country and race on a demographics form following
completion of the study. As in Study 1, during the study, Black participants were solely exposed
to a Black experimenter, whereas White participants were exposed to a White experimenter, in
an effort to encourage participants to express their feelings and attitudes openly and honestly.
4.3 Threat versus Control Manipulation
While waiting in the hallway for the experiment to begin, participants were greeted by
the experimenter and told that the current session was running behind schedule and that they
could participate in a few fun word searches to pass the time. All participants agreed to
participate in the tasks and were told to spend no more than five to eight minutes on the two
word searches combined. In the threat condition, participants completed two word searches that
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each included 10 negative and two neutral words. All of the negative words expressed a “bad
government” theme and each had been used in the media to describe President Obama, his
Administration, and/or the current economic crisis. These words were generated during a pilot
study conducted in the spring of 2010. In the pilot study, 11 undergraduate research assistants
(64% female; average age = 20.03, SD = .94) from the same university were asked to rate a list
of words (a total of 40, collected from various media sources) on the extent to which each word
was associated with President Obama and his Administration (on a scale of 1 [no association at
all] to 5 [extremely strong association]) and its degree of negativity (on a scale of 1 [strongly
negative] to 7 [strongly positive]). The final 20 words selected to be used in the word searches
were those that were scored as being more associated with President Obama and his
Administration and more negative. In the control condition, the two word searches included
strictly neutral words. See Appendix A for each pair of word searches (with answers circled)
used in the experimental and control conditions.
4.4 Measures
4.4.1 “Perception Tasks”
Upon entering the laboratory where the “real study” would be held, participants were told
that they would be participating in a study designed to examine age differences in visual
perception. Specifically, they were told that the experimenter was investigating whether college
students were better able to pick out the “correct” image from a series of eight images, compared
with older adults. The participants were shown three separate collections of eight photographs
each (each photograph was labeled with an arbitrary three-digit number) and were told to
respond to the experimenter’s question for each collection by writing down their answer (i.e., the
three-digit number corresponding to the photograph the participant selected as the “correct”
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image) on a sheet of paper. Importantly, the photographs within each collection were placed
randomly around a whiteboard.
The first and second collections of photographs were “filler collections.” The first
collection featured eight images of a scattering of matchsticks, each showing a different amount.
Upon showing the collection to the participants, the experimenter said, “Here is the first
collection. Please write down which photograph you think shows 115 matches.” Unbeknownst to
the participants, none of the photographs actually displayed 115 matches; instead, four of the
photographs displayed amounts less than 115 matches (80, 90, 100, and 110) and the other four
photographs displayed amounts greater than 115 matches (120, 130, 140, and 150). The second
collection featured eight images of the State of Illinois, each showing a different length of the
State. Upon showing the collection to the participants, the experimenter said, “Here is the second
collection. Please write down which photograph you think shows the correct State of Illinois.”
Again, none of the photographs represented the correct length of Illinois, but rather four
successively shorter versions of Illinois and four successively longer versions of Illinois. Lastly,
the third collection featured eight images of President Obama, each presenting him with a
slightly different skin color. The remaining areas of each of the eight photographs were not
altered with regards to color. Once again, upon showing the collection to the participants, the
experimenter said, “Here is the third collection. Please write down which photograph you think
shows the correct President Obama.” As with the other collections, none of the photographs
represented President’s Obama’s actual skin color. Four of the photographs showed a President
Obama with successively lighter skin color, and four of the photographs showed a President
Obama with successively darker skin color (the “actual” President Obama, although not present
in the collection of photographs, could be conceptualized as a midpoint image of 4.5 on this
41
measure). See Appendix A for the three collections of photographs. For ease of viewing, the
photographs are presented in order; the matchsticks are presented in smallest to largest amounts,
the state of Illinois is presented shortest to longest, and President Obama is presented lightest to
darkest. Importantly, for the purposes of our future analyses of the President Obama skin color
perception measure, we recoded participants’ responses, such that higher scores indicated a
“Blacker” President Obama.
4.4.2 Public and Private Collective Self-esteem and Identification
Measures of public and private American collective self-esteem, public and private racial
collective self-esteem, as well as identification with both the American and racial identities were
identical to those used in Study 1. Internal reliability of the public collective self-esteem measure
for the American identity was moderate for Blacks (α = .62), but was higher for Whites (α =
.75). Similarly, internal reliability of the public collective self-esteem measure for the racial
identity was moderate for Blacks (α = .52), but stronger for Whites (α = .72). Internal reliability
of the private collective self-esteem measure for the American identity was moderate for Blacks
(α = .66), but strong for Whites (α = .84). Likewise, internal reliability of the private collective
self-esteem measure for the racial identity was moderate for Blacks (α = .63), but higher for
Whites (α = .75).
4.4.3 White American Centrism
Participants responded to the 13-item White American Centrism (WAC) measure
discussed above. The measure was identical to that used in the pilot study. Internal reliability of
WAC was moderate for Blacks (α = .59), and high for Whites (α = .81).
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4.5 Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to either the experimental or control condition, and
as discussed above, all participants were first given the word searches while waiting in the
hallway for the “real study” to begin. The American public and private collective self-esteem
measures as well as the American identification item, along with the racial public and private
collective self-esteem measures and the racial identification item, were attached to the back of
the word search packet and presented in the same arrangement as that used in Study 1. The
participants were told to spend no more than five to eight minutes on the two word searches
combined and to spend the rest of the time on the rest of the packet (the collective self-esteem
and identification measures). Approximately 10 to 15 minutes later, once all of the participants
had completed the entire packet, the experimenter came back into the hallway.
Upon entering the laboratory, participants were told that they would be participating in a
study on visual perception and were presented with the three photograph collections, one-by-one,
as discussed above. Following these “perception tasks,” participants responded to the White
American Centrism measure, answered a demographic page (including their political views and
affiliations), and were debriefed.
4.6 Results and Discussion
4.6.1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics and correlations of the major variables in this
study for both the Black and White samples with conditions combined. Tables 3 and 4 display
this same information for the control and threat conditions, respectively. It is noteworthy that
Black and White participants did not differ significantly on White American Centrism (WAC),
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F(1, 171) = 1.05, ns, nor did participants significantly differ between the two conditions on
WAC, F(1, 171) = .38, ns. Also, the interaction was not significant for WAC, F(1, 171) = .06, ns.
4.6.2 Obama Skin Color Shift7
Recall that we predicted in Hypothesis 4 that in response to a currently threatening
American identity with which President Obama is affiliated, Black Americans who endorse
White American Centrism would perceive President Obama’s skin color to be “Whiter,”
compared to Black Americans who do not endorse White American Centrism. In contrast, we
predicted that there would be no effect of endorsement of White American Centrism on the
perception of President Obama’s skin color for White Americans in the threat condition.
Additionally, we expected that neither Blacks nor Whites would differentially categorize
President Obama’s skin color depending on their levels of White American Centrism in the
control condition.
To test these predictions, we performed a Race (Black vs. White) X Condition (threat vs.
control) X White American Centrism (standardized) univariate ANOVA on the participants’
ratings of President Obama’s skin color8. The results revealed a significant three-way interaction,
                                                 
7 We first performed a Race (Black vs. White) X Condition (experimental vs. control) X Identity
(American vs. racial) X Public_private (public vs. private) repeated measures ANOVA with the
last two factors as the repeated measures on the participants’ collective self-esteem scores, as we
did in Study 1 to detect the presence of any self-shift in identity valuation. As was predicted for
this study in which we did not intend to instill any feelings of vicarious shame nor compel the
participants to mobilize their own social identities, the four-way interaction was not significant,
F(1, 171) = 1.27, ns. In place of a self-shift, we predicted that the participants would characterize
the source of the threat (i.e., President Obama) in such a way as to protect their own social
identity.
8 To ensure that our participants were only perceiving differences in President Obama’s skin
color, versus the idea that the various groups may just perceive things differently in general, we
also performed the same Race (Black vs. White) X Condition (threat vs. control) X White
American Centrism (standardized) univariate ANOVA on the two other photographic
collections. There was no significant three-way interaction for either the perception of the
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F(1, 166) = 4.51, p < .05, ηp2 = .03. We then split the dataset by condition (threat vs. control) and
performed a Race (Black vs. White) X White American Centrism (standardized) univariate
ANOVA on the participants’ ratings of President Obama’s skin color for each condition. Results
revealed a significant interaction in the threat condition, F(1, 81) = 4.09, p <.05, ηp2 = .05, but
not in the control condition, F(1, 85) = .93, ns. No main effects of either Race or White
American Centrism were found to be significant in either condition (all Fs < 1.79, all ps > .19).
Regression equations, plotted in Figure 5 (control condition) and Figure 6 (threat condition), are
fit at +/- 1 standard deviation above and below the mean of White American Centrism.
 Within the threat condition only, a simple slope analysis (Aiken & West, 1991; West,
Aiken, & Krull, 1996) was performed to understand the Race X White American Centrism
interaction further. As shown in Figure 6, Black Americans high in White American Centrism
perceived President Obama to be “Whiter,” compared to those Black Americans low in White
American Centrism (β = -1.04, p = .07), as was predicted. In contrast, no effect of White
American Centrism on the perception of President Obama’s skin color was found for White
Americans (β  = .21, ns). Although this effect of White American Centrism for Black Americans
was only marginal via simple slope analysis, linear regression analyses revealed a significant
effect that supports our contention that White American Centrism is negatively related to the
perception of President Obama’s skin color for Black Americans (such that as endorsement of
White American Centrism increases, President Obama is perceived as “Whiter”), F(1, 22) =
4.50, p < .05. Again, no effect was found for White Americans, F(1, 59) = .67, ns.
Hypothesis 4 was supported. We suggest that in the absence of threat to the American
identity, the degree of endorsement of White American Centrism has no influence over the way
                                                                                                                                                              
quantity of matches, F(1, 164) = .001, ns, or the perception of the length of the State of Illinois,
F(1, 166) = .10, ns.
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in which either Black or White Americans categorize the racial identity of President Obama, and
the two groups do not classify him differently in this condition. However, when threatened with
an American identity that derives its negativity from the President and his Administration,
although White Americans remain unaffected, such that no matter their degree of endorsement of
White American Centrism they classify him similarly, Black Americans high in White American
Centrism (compared to those low in White American Centrism) perceive President Obama as
physically “Whiter” in skin color, perhaps as a mechanism to protect their own racial identity. As
discussed above, we believe that White Americans do not feel that their social identity is
implicated or threatened when their “Black” (via the rule of hypodescent) President becomes
affiliated with a negative American identity; after all, as long as he and the public categorize him
as Black, he remains distinct from the general White American public and the threat should be
minimized automatically. However, Black Americans, who ostensibly share both their national
and racial identities with President Obama, might feel the threat acutely. Fortunately for those
high in White American Centrism, who endorse that American = White, there is a convenient
way to restore a positive social identity; as long as American = White and President Obama is
American, he can be physically shifted into the White identity (compared to those low in White
American Centrism who classify him as “Blacker”), thereby removing the threat to (just) the
Black identity.
46
CHAPTER 5: GENERAL DISCUSSION
Results of the two studies revealed two primary findings. As predicted, in Study 1, in
response to vicarious shame related to the American national identity, Black Americans placed
more value on their racial identity, relative to their American identity. As the difference between
Blacks’ private racial collective self-esteem and private American collective self-esteem was
greater in the shame condition than in the control condition, we conclude that exposure to a
currently threatening American identity prompts a social identity shift for Black Americans, in
which they will momentarily deemphasize the amount of private collective self-esteem they
derive from their national identity and, so as to compensate for this loss, will simultaneously
enhance the amount of the private collective self-esteem generated by the racial identity. No such
effect was found for White Americans.
We suggest that Black and White Americans do not follow similar social identity shifting
trajectories due to a variety of factors including: (1) the varying degrees of perceived association
between the American identity and each of the racial identities (Devos & Banaji, 2005; Sidanius
et al., 1997), (2) the two groups’ dissimilar levels of identification with both the national and
racial identities (Crocker et al., 1994), and (3) where the two groups attribute blame for the Iraq
War (i.e., external or internal to the United States). We deduce that due to the “American =
White” effect (Devos & Banaji, 2005), Whites were unable to dissociate the two identities.
Further, our recent finding that White Americans more strongly identified with their American
identity than with their racial identity lends support to the idea that even if a dissociation between
the national and racial identities was possible for White Americans, the White identity apparently
fails to qualify as a comparable alternative to the American identity. Moreover, although we are
47
stimulus (their public American collective self-esteem decreased in the shame condition), we
believe that because they were able to make fewer internal attributions regarding the United
States’ involvement in the Iraq War (relative to Black Americans), the threat to social identity
was somewhat assuaged. Black Americans, in contrast, seemingly shift between their national
and racial identities due to these very same factors. That is, whereas the national and racial
identities strongly converge for the dominant (White) group in American society, these same
identities are relatively distinct, and at times conflicting, for Black Americans (Sidanius et al.,
1997; Phinney et al., 1997). This assertion, coupled with the finding that Blacks are strongly
identified with their racial identity (Crocker et al., 1994), make likely the probability that Black
Americans will be able to employ the inherent mobility between their national and racial
identities to shift between them; that the Black identity provides a quality alternative from which
to derive collective self-esteem is not trivial to this movement away from the American identity.
Lastly, we found that Black Americans were more willing to make internal attributions for the
United States’ involvement in the War. This result strengthens the idea that because Blacks
might understand this particular American wrongdoing more acutely, they are perhaps more
pressured (compared to Whites) to engage in a social identity shift.
Our second major finding of this research extends the idea of a self-shift to the concept of
target-shifting. We used the convenience of our current American situation – a faltering
economy, criticized policies, sustained wars, and the first “Black” President – to determine
whether Black and White Americans would differentially categorize a racially ambiguous
American target (President Barack Obama) intimately tied to a threatening American identity.
Due to the very much alive-and-well principle of hypodescent (Banks & Eberhardt, 1998; Ho et
al., 2011; Peery and Bodenhausen, 2008) and the belief that “American = White” (that we
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redefined in terms of White American Centrism, Dach-Grushow, 2006), we found support for
our prediction that only Black Americans high in White American Centrism would feel
compelled to perceive President Obama’s skin color as physically “Whiter” (compared to Blacks
low in White American Centrism) when threatened. Perhaps fearful that their biracial President’s
mistakes could be characterized by others as some sort of “Black” incompetence, Black
Americans who endorse White American Centrism can protect their racial identity by
categorizing President Obama as just another “White American” (within reason). As for White
Americans, we predicted and found no presence of target-shifting as a function of their
endorsement of White American Centrism. We believe that due to the rule of hypodescent,
White Americans are hardly implicated by their President’s errors and, in the event he disparages
the American identity, there should be no need to make him “Blacker” – after all, he is already
Black (“It’s official: Obama is black,” Apr. 3, 2010).
Taken together, these findings provide additional support for a theory of social identity
dynamicism, that social identity is both fluid and context dependent (Turner et al., 1994), and at
times, can be very much motivated, such that the choice of one social identity over another
becomes strategic (Mussweiler et al., 2000). The present research is unique, in that it supports
this theory at the intersection of nationality and race, and shows differential effects for Black and
White Americans. Indeed, although social identity appears to be flexible and even adaptive for
all social groups, the manifestation of its dynamicism is seemingly contingent upon the
relationships between the social identities implicated in the potential shift (Study 1) and the
societal norms and constraints that bind certain individuals to certain characterizations (Study 2).
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5.1 Limitations and Future Directions
Although we have established these trends with preliminary empirical support, we have
at least three remaining areas of unanswered questions that can be addressed by future research.
As for Study 1, we are left wondering as to whether White Americans respond in some
other way (with some other social identity) to perhaps make up for the loss of public American
collective self-esteem experienced in the shame condition. To review, we found that both Black
and White Americans experienced a decrease in their public American collective self-esteem as a
result of being shamed in the American identity, and we found that Black Americans were able
to restore a positive social identity by reassessing (and consequently enhancing) the value they
placed on their private racial identity (i.e., our findings showed that the private racial identity
was the source of more self-esteem for Blacks in the shame condition than was the private
American identity, and we are certain that had we compared their private racial identity to their
public American identity in the shame condition, the same effect would have been found –
though its interpretation would have been somewhat discordant). But what happens to White
Americans? They, too, experienced a drop in public American collective self-esteem when
vicariously shamed in their American identity, and although we determined that they may have
been more able to explain away the threat by making fewer internal attributions about the United
States’ involvement in the War (compared to Black Americans who ultimately shifted the value
they placed on their various social identities), we are skeptical that such attributional reasoning is
enough to keep the overall esteem generated by social identity high.
In previous studies (Rosner & Hong, 2007), we used the same manipulation that was used
in Study 1 and, in addition to measuring public and private American and racial collective self-
esteem, we also measured trait self-esteem in the form of the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale
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(Rosenberg, 1965). The scale consists of 10 items (e.g., “I take a positive attitude toward
myself”) for which responses are given on four-point scales ranging from 1 (strongly disagree)
to 4 (strongly agree). We had conjectured that instead of moving between their various social
identities in response to a shameful American identity, White Americans might just abandon the
idea of deriving value from social identity altogether (at least for the moment) and find some
new maximum degree of self-esteem in their personal selves (i.e., “My country is currently not
very highly regarded by others and I am not so glad to be an American, but I am still satisfied
with myself”). Interestingly, this prediction was not supported, and although we found an effect
of race, such that Black Americans had generally higher levels of trait self-esteem across
conditions compared to White Americans, neither group experienced an increase in trait self-
esteem following the vicarious shame manipulation. Although White Americans may be
insulated from having to reassess the value placed upon their various social identities when the
American identity goes under fire, we suggest that future research should allow them other social
identities from which to choose. If the racial social identity does not provide a quality alternative,
for reasons described above (i.e., too tightly bound to the American identity, Devos & Banaji,
2005; socially inappropriate, Frankenberg, 1993; Swain, 2002; lack of identification and feelings
of closeness to other White group members, Wong & Cho, 2005), perhaps an ethnic (i.e., family
heritage, culture), religious, or even occupational social identity can be momentarily given
enhanced value in response to a currently shameful American social identity.
We also note a related limitation in Study 2 for both Black and White Americans.
Although we found that Black Americans high in White American Centrism and currently under
threat perceived President Obama to be physically “Whiter,” compared to the perception of their
counterparts low in White American Centrism, we are left curious as to whether either Black or
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White Americans may have also been inclined to shift his national identity in response to his
affiliation with a currently failing American identity. Specifically, we wonder whether White
Americans high in White American Centrism and currently under threat would perceive their
President to be less American. Although in the current research, participants were not given the
opportunity to judge or rate President Obama’s American identity (they were only presented with
pictures of him with different shades of skin color), we predict that, if presented with pictures of
the President at varying levels of “Americanness” (i.e., perhaps his physical distance to an
American flag), there should be differences between Blacks and Whites, and between those high
and low in White American Centrism. One hypothesis is that for White Americans under threat,
those high in White American Centrism would perceive the President to be less American
(because he is “Black” via hypodescent) than would those White Americans low in White
American Centrism. In contrast, we might also predict that for Black Americans under threat,
those low in White American Centrism would perceive the President to be less American,
perhaps as a method by which to sustain their belief system (i.e., “I believe that ‘American’ can
mean many things, including ‘Black,’ but because the President is not American, my racial
identity is not threatened by him”). Other hypotheses abound, and it would be interesting to
include a measure in follow-up studies to assess participants’ perceptions of President Obama’s
degree of “Americanness.” Giving participants an option to either shift the President’s racial
identity or his national identity (or both, simultaneously) would prove to be particularly
revealing.
Lastly, whereas we are fairly certain that Study 1 adequately measured the various types
of collective self-esteem (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992) of our participants, thereby allowing us to
infer that minimizing the value placed on one identity and simultaneously increasing the value
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placed on another identity served as a method by which to maintain a positive self-image, we can
only assume the motivation behind the target-shifting present in Study 2. That is, because we did
not measure the various types of collective self-esteem after giving the participants the option to
select the “correct” President Obama, we do not know whether target-shifting served as a means
to sustain some version of collective self-esteem. Therefore, for now, we can only speculate that
Black Americans high in White American Centrism and under threat were able to maintain their
racial collective self-esteem because they shifted the racial identity of President Obama away
from their own. Future work should include conditions in which participants are not given the
opportunity to mobilize the racial identity of President Obama following exposure to an
American threat of which he is the source. Further, later outcome measures should include public
and private American and racial collective self-esteem, such that we might then be able to
determine if moving the President’s racial (or national) identity actually serves to maintain (or
even increase) one or more of the various types of collective self-esteem.
5.2 Implications of a Post-Racial America
Among the many hopes, opinions, and lay hypotheses professed during President
Obama’s campaign was the speculation that Americans might finally be capable of ushering in a
“post-racial era” in which the United States finally rids itself of racial preference, discrimination,
and prejudice. If this post-racial era is to actually play out, what should be most noticeable for
most Americans will not be a dramatic decrease in crude, off-color remarks or deplorable hate
crimes, but rather the increase in the non-issue of race. Recent demographic predictions project
that non-Hispanic Whites will cease to be the numerical majority group in the United States by
2060 (Wong & Cho, 2005), suggesting that the tightly held link between “American” and “just
White” may soon dissolve. According to author Gregory Rodriguez of Mongrels, Bastards,
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Orphans, and Vagabonds, much of this demographic change will be due to intermarriage,
especially amongst Mexican- and Anglo-Americans, and those are not the only groups
intermingling (Rodriguez, 2007). Maria Arana of The Washington Post writes, “The explosion of
‘minorities’ in the United States in the past half-century has guaranteed that ever more
interracial mingling is inevitable. According to the 2000 Census, there were 1.5 million
Hispanic-white marriages in the United States, half a million Asian-white marriages, and more
than a quarter-million black-white marriages. The reality is probably closer to double or triple
that number. And growing” (2008, p. B01).
Given these statistics, we are excited to observe how a post-racial society might capitalize
on the idea of social identity dynamicism. That is, when “American” no longer equates to
“White,” how will the “new” Americans – those bi-racials and tri-racials and “others” – define
themselves? Will their self-definition and the value they place on their many social identities still
be contingent upon the current status (shameful or otherwise) of the American identity, as it was
in Study 1? In the event of a shameful American identity, will White Americans finally get a
chance to dissociate from their American identity and find more value in their now distinct racial
identity? We further wonder whether the rule of hypodescent will still apply, and if it does not,
how will a mixed-race leader be categorized? Will his or her designation still depend on
something as archaic as White American Centrism, as it was in Study 2? These questions and
others abound, and although the present research sought to address some preliminary answers,
we will just have to wait for a post-racial America in order to follow up.
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APPENDIX A
6.1 Mock Letter Home – Experimental (Shame) Condition, Study 1
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6.2 Mock Letter Home – Control Condition, Study 1
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6.3 Public Collective Self-Esteem Scale – American Identity
We are interested in how you feel about being an American at this moment. There are no right or
wrong answers to any of these statements; we are interested in your honest reactions and
opinions at this moment. Please read each statement carefully and respond using the following
scale from 1 to 7:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly
disagree
Disagree Somewhat
disagree
Neutral Somewhat
agree
Agree Strongly
agree
_____ 1.  Overall, Americans are considered good by others.
_____ 2.  Most people consider Americans, on the average, to be more ineffective than other
    groups.
_____ 3.  In general, others respect Americans.
_____ 4.  In general, others think that Americans are unworthy.
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6.4 Public Collective Self-Esteem Scale – Racial Identity
We are interested in how you feel about being a member of your racial group at this moment
(e.g., Asian, Black, White, etc.). Write your racial group right now on the following line:
My racial group: ________________________________________________________________
For the first blank below, fill in the name of your racial group again and mentally place the name
of this group onto each of the other blank lines. There are no right or wrong answers to any of
these statements; we are interested in your honest reactions and opinions at this moment. Please
read each statement carefully and respond using the following scale from 1 to 7:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly
disagree
Disagree Somewhat
disagree
Neutral Somewhat
agree
Agree Strongly
agree
_____ 1.  Overall, _____ are considered good by others.
_____ 2.  Most people consider _____, on the average, to be more ineffective than other
    groups.
_____ 3.  In general, others respect _____.
_____ 4.  In general, others think that _____ are unworthy.
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6.5 Private Collective Self-Esteem Scale – American Identity
We are interested in how you feel about being an American at this moment. There are no right or
wrong answers to any of these statements; we are interested in your honest reactions and
opinions at this moment. Please read each statement carefully and respond using the following
scale from 1 to 7:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly
disagree
Disagree Somewhat
disagree
Neutral Somewhat
agree
Agree Strongly
agree
_____ 1.  I often regret that I am American.
_____ 2.  In general, I’m glad to be an American.
_____ 3.  Overall, I often feel that being an American is not worthwhile.
_____ 4.  I feel good about being an American.
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6.6 Private Collective Self-Esteem Scale – Racial Identity
We are interested in how you feel about being a member of your racial group at this moment
(e.g., Asian, Black, White, etc.). Write your racial group right now on the following line:
My racial group: ________________________________________________________________
For the first blank below, fill in the name of your racial group again and mentally place the name
of this group onto each of the other blank lines. There are no right or wrong answers to any of
these statements; we are interested in your honest reactions and opinions at this moment. Please
read each statement carefully and respond using the following scale from 1 to 7:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly
disagree
Disagree Somewhat
disagree
Neutral Somewhat
agree
Agree Strongly
agree
_____ 1. I often regret that I am _____.
_____ 2. In general, I’m glad to be _____.
_____ 3. Overall, I often feel that being _____ is not worthwhile.
_____ 4. I feel good about being _____.
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6.7 White American Centrism Scale
Please read through the following statements carefully and indicate the degree to which you
agree or disagree with each using the following response scale. Record your response to the left
of each item.
1 2 3 4 5 6
Strongly
disagree
Somewhat
disagree
Slightly
disagree
Slightly agree Somewhat
agree
Strongly
agree
_____ 1. Only certain people can be American.
_____ 2. Americans are born, not made.
_____ 3. Ethnicity has no bearing on whether one can be called American.
_____ 4. Anyone in the U.S. who values the American dream and works hard to
   benefit this country is an American.
_____ 5. National origin has no bearing on whether one can be called American.
_____ 6. Anyone who legally immigrates to the U.S. and values American culture is a
   true American.
 _____ 7. Anyone can become American.
_____ 8. I usually assume the term Americans refers to White Americans.
_____ 9. Mainstream American culture is more than just White culture.
_____ 10. White Anglo-Saxon values form the core of American values.
_____ 11. White Americans form the mainstream of America.
_____ 12. Generally the term American refers to White Americans.
_____ 13. America is a White country.
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6.8 Protestant Work Ethic Scale
Please read through the following statements carefully and indicate the degree to which you
agree or disagree with each using the following response scale. Record your response to the left
of each item.
1 2 3 4 5 6
Strongly
disagree
Somewhat
disagree
Slightly
disagree
Slightly agree Somewhat
agree
Strongly
agree
_____ 1. Most people spend too much time in unprofitable amusements.
_____ 2. Our society would have fewer problems if people had less leisure time.
_____ 3. Money acquired easily (e.g., through gambling or speculation) is
   usually spent unwisely.
_____ 4. There are few satisfactions equal to the realization that one has done his or her best at a
   job.
_____ 5. The most difficult college courses usually turn out to be the most rewarding.
_____ 6. Most people who don’t succeed in life are just plain lazy.
_____ 7. The self-made man is likely to be more successful if he sacrifices
   certain pleasures.
_____ 8. I often feel I would be more successful if I sacrificed certain pleasures.
_____ 9. People should have more leisure time to spend in relaxation.
_____ 10. Any man who is able and willing to work hard has a good chance of succeeding.
_____ 11. People who fail at a job have usually not tried hard enough.
_____ 12. Life would have very little meaning if we never had to suffer.
_____ 13. Hard work offers little guarantee of success.
_____ 14. The credit card is a ticket to careless spending.
_____ 15. Life would be more meaningful if we had more leisure time.
_____ 16. The man who can approach an unpleasant task with enthusiasm is the man who gets
     ahead.
_____ 17. If one works hard enough he is likely to make a good life for himself.
_____ 18. I feel uneasy when there is little work for me to do.
_____ 19. A distaste for hard work usually reflects a weakness of character.
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6.9 Lay Theory of Race Scale
Please read through the following statements carefully and indicate the degree to which you
agree or disagree with each using the following response scale. Record your response to the left
of each item.
1 2 3 4 5 6
Strongly
disagree
Somewhat
disagree
Slightly
disagree
Slightly agree Somewhat
agree
Strongly
agree
_____ 1. To a larger extent, a person’s race biologically determines his or her abilities and traits.
_____ 2. Although a person can adapt to different cultures, it is hard if not impossible to change
   the biological dispositions of a person’s race.
_____ 3. How a person is like (e.g., his or her abilities, traits) is deeply ingrained in his or her
   racial dispositions. It cannot be changed much.
_____ 4. A person’s race is something very basic about them and it can’t be changed much.
_____ 5. Races are just arbitrary categories and can be changed if necessary.
_____ 6. Racial categories are constructed totally for economic, political and social reasons. If
   the socio-political situation changes, the racial categories will change as well.
_____ 7. Race does not have an inherent static basis, and can be changed.
_____ 8. Racial categories are fluid, malleable constructs.
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6.10 Symbolic Racism 2000 Scale
Please read through the following statements carefully and indicate the degree to which you
agree or disagree with each using the following response scales.
1. It’s really a matter of some people
not trying hard enough; if Blacks
would only try harder they could be
just as well off as Whites.
1
Strongly
agree
2
Somewhat
agree
3
Somewhat
disagree
4
Strongly
disagree
2. Irish, Italian, Jewish, and many
other minorities overcame prejudice
and worked their way up. Blacks
should do the same.
1
Strongly
agree
2
Somewhat
agree
3
Somewhat
disagree
4
Strongly
disagree
3. Some say that Black leaders have
been trying to push too fast. Others
feel that they haven’t pushed fast
enough. What do you think?
1
Trying to
push too
fast
2
Going to
slowly
3
Moving at
about the
right speed
4. How much of the racial tension
that exists in the United States today
do you think Blacks are responsible
for creating?
1
 All of it
2
Most
3
Some
4
Not
much at
all
5. How much discrimination against
Blacks do you feel there is in the
United States today, limiting their
chances to get ahead?
1
 A lot
2
Some
3
Just a little
4
None at
all
6. Generations of slavery and
discrimination have created
conditions that make it difficult for
Blacks to work their way out of the
lower class.
1
Strongly
agree
2
Somewhat
agree
3
Somewhat
disagree
4
Strongly
disagree
7. Over the past few years, Blacks
have gotten less than they deserve.
1
Strongly
agree
2
Somewhat
agree
3
Somewhat
disagree
4
Strongly
disagree
8. Over the past few years, Blacks
have gotten more economically than
they deserve.
1
Strongly
agree
2
Somewhat
agree
3
Somewhat
disagree
4
Strongly
disagree
72
6.11 Word Search – Experimental (Threat) Condition, Study 2
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6.12 Word Search – Control Condition, Study 2
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6.13 “Perception Tasks,” Study 2
“Here is the first collection. Please write down which photograph you think shows 115
matches.”
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
77
“Here is the second collection. Please write down which photograph you think shows the correct
State of Illinois.”
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
78
“Here is the third collection. Please write down which photograph you think shows the correct
President Obama.”
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
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APPENDIX B
Table 1. Descriptive statistics and inter-correlations among main variables in Study 1
(combining experimental and control conditions)
Black American participants (N = 51)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Public American CSE -
2. Private American CSE .46** -
3. American ID .18 .37** -
4. Public racial CSE .20 -.01 .03 -
5. Private racial CSE .07 .38** .14 .10 -
6. Racial ID .07 .18 .08 .05 .15 -
7. Attributions for the War -.03 -.31* -.22 .00 -.07 .12 -
Mean 4.01 5.36 5.20 3.42 6.42 5.78 4.06
SD 1.08 1.18 1.34 .81 .84 1.40 .90
White American participants (N = 91)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Public American CSE -
2. Private American CSE .48** -
3. American ID .30** .52** -
4. Public racial CSE .34** .21 .03 -
5. Private racial CSE .15 .27** .22* .64** -
6. Racial ID .11 .12 .14 .37** .61** -
7. Attributions for the War -.30** -.34** -.20 .02 -.11 -.03 -
Mean 4.29 6.00 5.55 5.20 5.98 4.54 3.72
SD 1.04 .89 1.19 .95 .80 1.84 .98
Note. * denotes p < .05; ** denotes p < .01
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics and inter-correlations among main variables in Study 2,
combined conditions
Black American participants (N = 46)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. Public American CSE -
2. Private American CSE .46** -
3. American ID .27 .41** -
4. Public racial CSE .26 .03 -.14 -
5. Private racial CSE .13 -.003 .12 .32* -
6. Racial ID .03 -.24 -.005 .04 .29 -
7. WAC -.07 -.09 -.03 -.24 -.18 -.10 -
8. Obama’s skin color perception -.10 -.16 -.06 .33* .03 .24 -.13 -
Mean 4.22 5.82 4.83 3.47 6.38 5.83 2.68 4.13
SD .90 .78 1.45 .83 .69 1.31 .59 2.12
White American participants (N = 129)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. Public American CSE -
2. Private American CSE .46** -
3. American ID .36** .53** -
4. Public racial CSE .44** .30** .32** -
5. Private racial CSE .31** .43** .40** .64** -
6. Racial ID .15 .34** .48** .42** .57** -
7. WAC .09 .10 .01 .01 .14 .16 -
8. Obama’s skin color perception .15 .04 .14 .10 .06 .06 -.05 -
Mean 4.45 6.03 5.42 5.33 5.90 5.57 2.57 4.02
SD .98 .83 1.29 .79 .78 1.24 .68 2.18
Note. * denotes p < .05; ** denotes p < .01
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics and inter-correlations among main variables in Study 2,
control condition
Black American participants (N = 22)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. Public American CSE -
2. Private American CSE .40 -
3. American ID .35 .13 -
4. Public racial CSE .43* .20 -.03 -
5. Private racial CSE .37 .03 .34 .23 -
6. Racial ID .32 -.15 .29 .006 .15 -
7. WAC -.23 -.24 -.07 -.30 -.04 -.20 -
8. Obama’s skin color perception -.02 -.14 -.04 .29 -.10 .44* .04 -
Mean 4.32 5.97 4.95 3.55 6.36 5.59 2.70 4.41
SD .92 .76 1.36 .84 .72 1.40 .69 2.36
White American participants (N = 67)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. Public American CSE -
2. Private American CSE .39** -
3. American ID .40** .55** -
4. Public racial CSE .52** .25* .32** -
5. Private racial CSE .29* .30* .34** .65** -
6. Racial ID .12 .32** .47** .33** .49** -
7. WAC .15 .20 .15 -.01 .15 .17 -
8. Obama’s skin color perception .30* .09 .25* .13 .000 -.01 -.20 -
Mean 4.44 6.08 5.45 5.29 5.98 5.54 2.61 4.16
SD .95 .70 1.37 .77 .69 1.27 .67 2.25
Note. * denotes p < .05; ** denotes p < .01
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics and inter-correlations among main variables in Study 2,
threat condition
Black American participants (N = 24)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. Public American CSE -
2. Private American CSE .51* -
3. American ID .21 .61** -
4. Public racial CSE .08 -.15 -.24 -
5. Private racial CSE -.10 -.03 -.10 .40 -
6. Racial ID -.25 -.29 -.25 .11 .45* -
7. WAC .15 .07 .02 -.18 -.38 .06 -
8. Obama’s skin color perception -.22 -.24 -.10 .36 .19 .04 -.41* -
Mean 4.15 5.68 4.71 3.40 6.39 6.04 2.66 3.88
SD .89 .80 1.55 .84 .68 1.20 .49 1.87
White American participants (N = 62)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. Public American CSE -
2. Private American CSE .52** -
3. American ID .32* .53** -
4. Public racial CSE .37** .34** .33** -
5. Private racial CSE .34** .51** .45** .66** -
6. Racial ID .18 .36** .51** .51** .67** -
7. WAC .03 .009 -.17 .04 .13 .17 -
8. Obama’s skin color perception -.002 -.02 -.01 .09 .11 .16 .11 -
Mean 4.47 5.98 5.39 5.37 5.81 5.60 2.52 3.87
SD 1.02 .95 1.19 .82 .87 1.21 .69 2.12
Note. * denotes p < .05; ** denotes p < .01
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Figure 1. Race X Identity
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Figure 2. Race (Black vs. White) X Condition (experimental vs. control) X Identity
(American vs. racial) X Public_private (public vs. private)
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Figure 2 con’t
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Figure 3. Difference scores between types of private collective self-esteem for Black
American participants
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Figure 4. Difference scores between types of private collective self-esteem for White
American participants
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Figure 5. Race (Black vs. White) X White American Centrism (standardized) in Control
Condition
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Figure 6. Race (Black vs. White) X White American Centrism (standardized) for Threat
Condition
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